We present several integral attacks on MISTY1 using the F O Relation, which is derived from Sakurai-Zheng Property used in previous attacks. The F O Relation is a more precise form of the Sakurai-Zheng Property such that the functions in the F O Relation depend on 16-bit inputs instead of 32-bit inputs used in previous attacks, and that the functions do not change for different keys while previous works used different functions. Thus we can reduce the attack complexity by a factor of 2 20.68 . We use the F O Relation to improve the 5-round integral attack. The data complexity of our attack, 2 34 chosen plaintexts, is the same as previous attack, but the running time is reduced from 2 48 encryptions to 2 27.32 encryptions. The attack is then extended by one more round with a data complexity of 2 34 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 108.10 encryptions. By exploring the key schedule weakness of the cipher, we also present a chosen ciphertext attack on 6-round MISTY1 with all the F L layers with a data complexity of 2 32 chosen ciphertexts and a time complexity of 2 126 encryptions. Compared with other attacks on 6-round MISTY1, our attack has the least data complexity.
Introduction
The MISTY1 algorithm is a block cipher with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key size proposed by Matsui [10] . It was recommended by the European NESSIE project and the CRYPTREC project, and became an ISO standard in 2005. The cipher generally uses an 8-round Feistel structure with a round function F O. Before each odd round and after the last round, there is an additional F L layer.
Many cryptanalysis results on MISTY1 have been published [1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13] . The integral attack on 5 rounds with all but the last F L layers [6] requires 2 34 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2 48 encryptions. The impossible differential attack on 6 rounds with all the F L layers [3] requires 2 51 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2 123. 4 encryptions. With all the F L functions absent, the impossible differential attack [3] could break the 7 rounds with data complexity of 2 50.2 known plaintexts and time complexity of 2 114.1 encryptions.
In this paper, we present several integral attacks using a more precise form of the variant Sakurai-Zheng Property for the round function F O. We call this new property the F O Relation. Sakurai-Zheng Property was founded by Sakurai and Zheng in [11] . Knudsen and Wagner used a variation of this property for the F O function to attack the 5-round MISTY1 [6] . Compared with the variant Sakurai-Zheng property, there are two merits of the F O Relation: the inputs of the functions in the F O Relation are shortened from 32 bits to 16 bits, and these functions do not change for different keys while the previous property used different functions for different keys.
We use this new relation to improve the integral attack [6] on 5 rounds with all but the last F L layers. The data complexity of our improved attack is 2 34 chosen plaintexts, and the time complexity of the attack is 2 27.32 encryptions. Compared with the 5-round integral attack [6] , the time complexity of our attack is reduced from 2 48 to 2 27.32 with the same data complexity.
Next, we extend the 5-round attack by one more round. Using the equivalent description of the F O function [7, 13] and the F O Relation, we modify the partial decryption process of computing the required intermediate values to reduce the key bits needed.The data complexity of this 6-round attack is 2 34 chosen plaintexts, and the time complexity of the attack is 2 108.10 encryptions.
We also provide an attack on 6 rounds with all the F L layers. The attack is a chosen ciphertext attack starting from the F L 3 , F L 4 layer to the end of the cipher. We explore the key schedule weakness to speed up the computation of the required intermediate values. The data complexity of the attack is 2 32 chosen ciphertexts, and the time complexity of the attack is 2 126 encryptions. Compared with other attacks on 6 rounds with all the F L layers, our attack has the least data complexity. The summarization of our attacks and previous attacks is listed in Table 1 , where the data complexity is measured by the number of plaintexts/ciphertexts and the time complexity is measured by the number of encryptions needed in the attack.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give a brief description of MISTY1 block cipher. We present the F O Relation in Section 3, and then use this new property to improve the integral attack on 5-round MISTY1 with all but the last F L layers in Section 4. Section 5 extends the 5-round attack to 6 rounds with all but the last F L layers. In Section 6 we present the attack on 6 rounds with all the F L layers. Section 7 concludes this paper.
The MISTY1 Block Cipher
MISTY1 is a block cipher with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key size. Let P and C denote the 64 bit plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. We use the superscript without brackets to distinguish the values MISTY1 has a recursive structure. As shown in Figure 1 (a), the cipher generally uses an 8-round Feistel structure with a round function F O. In each round, the left 32-bit part is functioned with the F O function, and then is XORed with the right 32 bits. This new 32-bit value is the left 32-bit input of the next round and the right 32-bit input of the next round is the original 32 left bits. Before each odd round and after the last round, there is an additional F L layer.
In the original specification of MISTY1 [10] , the round function F O uses a 112-bit key. Several equivalent descriptions of the F O function [7, 13] have been proposed, which use less key bits. Here we use the equivalent F O description presented in [7] with a little modification. The round function F O i itself has a 3-round Feistel-like structure. The 32-bit input of F O i is divided into two 16 bits, denoted as IL i and IR i , respectively. In each round, the left 16-bit part is XORed with a subkey AKO i,1 and then functioned with F I using a 9-bit key AKI i,1 . The output of the F I is XORed with the right 16 bits. The left 16 bits and the right 16 bits are then swaped. The same procedure is repeated three times, the left 16 bits and the right 16 bits after the third round are denoted as M L i and M R i . OL i is the XOR of M L i and the subkey AKO i,4 , and OR i is the XOR of M R i and AKO i,5 . The output of F O i is OL i ||OR i (|| denotes concatenation).
All the AKO i,k (1 ≤ k ≤ 5) are 16-bit subkeys, and all the AKI i,k (1 ≤ k ≤ 3) are 9-bit subkeys, hence Subkey Correspondence is zero and AKO
is equal to AKO
, the F O i function actually takes a 98-bit key.
The F I function also has a 3-round Feistel-like structure. In the first round, the left 9-bit input enters a S-box S9, and then is XORed with the right 7-bit input(padded two zero bits left to the 7 bits). Swap the left and the right parts. In the second round, the left 7-bit part enters a S-box S7 and then is XORed with the right 9 bits(truncated the left 2 bits). The right 9-bit part is XORed with AKI i,1 and then is swaped with the left 7 bits. The third round of F I is the same as the first round.
In the F L layer, the left 32 bits and the right 32 bits are put into the F L functions. In each F L function, the 32-bit input is divided into two blocks of 16 bits. The left 16-bit part is ANDed with the subkey KL i,1 , and then XORed with the right 16 bits to produce the right 16-bit output. This right 16-bit output is ORed with the subkey KL i,2 and then XORed with left 16 bits to produce the left 16-bit output.
The key schedule of MISTY1 divides the 128-bit key into eight 16-bit words K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K 8 . Another eight 16-bit words are computed by
The correspondence of these 16 bit words and the subkeys used in the encryption is listed in Table 2 .
The F O Relation
The following proposition on the F O function, which is a variant for Sakurai-Zheng Property [11] , is presented in [6] . 
where f AKO i,1 and g AKO i,2 are functions related to subkeys AKO i,1 and AKO i,2 , respectively, and k is a constant related to the key used in this F O i function.
As shown in Figure 1 (b), M L i is the XOR of the values corresponding to the point α and β, hence OL
. Since the left 7 bits of the values at α and β are not related to AKI i,1 and AKI i,2 , Equation (1) holds by letting f AKO i,1 (IL i ||IR i ) correspond to the left 7 bits of the value at α, g AKO i,2 (IL i ||IR i ) correspond to the left 7 bits of the value at β and the key-related constant k correspond to AKO
. Expanding f AKO i,1 and g AKO i,2 , Equation (1) is
where F I (1...7) denotes the partial F I function which inputs 16-bit input of F I, and outputs the left 7-bit output of F I. By identical transformation, Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:
and the key-related constant k be AKO
, Equation (1) still holds, but f AKO i,1 is not related to IR i and g AKO i,2 is not related to IL i . Hence Proposition 3.1 can be refined as follows:
where f and g are two fixed functions, and k is a constant related to the key used in this F O i function.
The F O Relation can be viewed as an improvement of Proposition 3.1. There are two folds of the improvement:
1. The functions f and g used in Lemma 3.2 rely only on the 16-bit partial input of the F O function instead of the whole 32-bit input used in Proposition 3.1 (the original Sakurai-Zheng Property [11] is similar to this form, however, Proposition 3.1 for the F O function proposed in [6] does not have this property).
2. The functions f and g are not related to the subkeys AKO i,1 and AKO i,2 . The Subkeys AKO i,1 and AKO i,2 are moved into the inputs of the functions f and g.
These two merits will benefit our attack. Based on the F O Relation, the following theorem can be obtained:
. . ,IL 2n ||OL 2n denote 2n inputs of the F O function of round i for some even number 2n, the following equation holds:
This theorem indicates that to obtain the value of Based on this theorem, we are ready to present our attack.
Improved Integral Attack on 5-Round MISTY1
The integral attack on 5-round MISTY1 with all but the last F L layers, which was proposed in [6] , uses the following four-round integral:
Proposition 4.1 ([6] ). Consider such a structure (named integral structure) of 2 32 plaintexts where the left 32 bits are held constant and the right 32 bits take on all possible values. The four round integral after F L 6 (the XOR of all the 2 32 32-bit corresponding intermediate values of the structure after F L 6 ) is equal to zero.
The main idea of the attack is to partially decrypt the encryptions of the structure and check whether Proposition 4.1 holds. Proposition 3.1 shown in Section 3 is used for fast checking whether the left seven bits of the integral are equal to zero predicated by Proposition 4.1.
We improve the above attack by using the F O Relation, which provides a more efficient method for checking the left seven bits of the integral than Proposition 3.1. The attack is as follows: j=1 f (IL j 5 ⊕ AKO 5,1 ) by computing 2 15 times function f . If we precompute all the possible value of function f (the time for this preprocess can be neglected compared with the total time complexity), it is possible use table look up to speed up. Since one time of table look up takes no more than 2 −7 encryptions, the running time for Step 2(a) is no more than 2 15 · 2 −7 · 2 16 = 2 24 encryptions for an integral structure. Hence, this step needs only about 2 26 encryptions for all the four integral structures. By using similar technique, Step 2(b) also needs about 2 26 encryptions.
In Step 2(c), each guess of AKO 5,1 , AKO 5,2 pair has a probability of 2 −7 passing the check of an integral structure. For each integral structure, if we generate all the values could pass this check and then check whether they have already been discarded, there are at most 2 32 · 2 −7 = 2 25 candidates need to check for each integral structure. Since checking one pair needs only one table look up, this step needs about 2 26 · 2 −7 = 2 19 encryptions, which is neglectable compared with the time used in Step 2(a) and 2(b).
After checking of four integral structures, the probability of one AKO 5,1 , AKO 5,2 pair not being discarded is 2 −28 , thus there are about 2 4 such pairs entering Step 3. Therefore, it is possible to finish this step within 2 25 encryptions. After Step 3, only the correct guess remains and the wrong guesses are all discarded with high probability.
As shown above, the total time needed is dominated by Step 2(a), Step 2(b) and Step 3. Hence, the time complexity of this attack is about 2 26 + 2 26 + 2 25 = 2 27.32 encryptions.
Attack on 6-Round MISTY1 Without the Last F L Layer
In this section, we extend the improved 5-round integral attack to 6-round without the last FL layer. To apply the method of the 5-round integral attack, the 6-round attack needs to recover the actual value of the input of F O 5 , which means the attack needs to partially decrypt the sixth round. However, directly guessing 98 key bits used in F O 6 will make the attack slower than exhaustive key search. To reduce the time needed, we start from the following observation.
As shown in Figure 2 , the input of F O 5 , IL 5 ||IR 5 , can be written as C (1...16) ⊕M L 6 ⊕AKO 6,4 ||C (17...32) ⊕ M R 6 ⊕ AKO 6, 5 . The corresponding form of Equation (4) is then (c) Discard all AKO 6,4 ⊕AKO 5,1 , AKO 6,5 ⊕AKO 5,2 pairs such that
4. For the guessed keys that are not discarded, exhaustively search for remaining key bits.
For each guessed 75-bit key, Step 2 partially decrypts 2 34 encryptions. Each partial decryption takes no more than 1/4 encryption. So this step needs about 2 32 encryptions for each guessed 75-bit key.
As shown in Section 4, Both Step 3(a) and 3(b) need less than 2 27 encryptions for the four integral structures, and Step 3(c) needs neglectable time compared with Step 3(a) and 3(b).
There are expected 2 4 out of 2 32 possible AKO 5,1 ⊕ AKO 6,4 , AKO 5,2 ⊕ AKO 6,5 pairs entering Step 4 for each guessed 75 bits in Step 2. For each guess entering Step 4, the attack exhaustively searches the 2 21 possible remaining key bits. So the running time of this step is about 2 25 encryptions for each guessed 75-bit key in Step 2.
As a result, the total time complexity of this attack is 2 75 · (2 32 + 2 27 + 2 27 + 2 25 ) = 2 108.10 encryptions.
6 Attack on 6-Round MISTY1 With All F L Layers
In this attack, we do a chosen ciphertext attack on last 6 round MISTY1 block cipher with all F L functions. The encryption then starts before the F L 3 , F L 4 layer and ends at the end of the cipher.
In this attack, we also make use of the 4-round integral. Since the attack is a chosen ciphertext attack, the four round integral corresponds to the XOR of all the 2 32 32-bit intermediate values of the integral structure before F L 5 . We also use Theorem 3.3 for fast checking the integral. As shown in Figure 3 , the Equation (4) of Theorem 3.3 for the forth round can be rewritten as:
where D denotes the result of the plaintext P passing through first F L 3 and F L 4 layer as shown in Figure  3 .
We need to obtain the values of D (33...48) ⊕ M L 3 and D (49...64) ⊕ M R 3 from decryptions. For one encryption, if the attack partially decrypts for these values directly, it needs to guess at least total 105 key bits. Such a guess together with 2 32 partial decryption will make the attack slower than exhaustive key search. However, to check Equation (6) By exploring the key schedule weakness, we notice that none of the two processes needs all the 105 key bits. To obtain D (33...48) , the attack needs KL 4,1 and KL 4,2 , which are K 4 and K 6 . To obtain M L 3 from the plaintext P , the attack needs only the subkeys KL 3,1 , KL 3,2 , AKO 3,1 , AKO 3,2 , AKI 3,1 and AKI 3,2 , which correspond to
. Thus, only K 4, K 2 , K 8 , K 3 , K 5 and K 6 are required. Consider the process of computing D (49...64) ⊕M R 3 . To obtain D (49...64) , the attack only needs to know KL 4,1 (K 4 ) but not KL 4,2 (K 6 ). To obtain M R 3 , the attack needs only KL 3,1 , KL 3,2 , AKO 3,1 , AKO 3,2 , AKO 3,3 , AKI 3,1 , AKI 3,2 and AKI 3,3 , which correspond to
,K 
Discard all guesses of
such that Equation (6) , and then check whether Equation (6) holds. Hence Step 5 checks 2 32 guesses, and the time needed is also neglectable to Step 3. For each guess of the 32 bit K 6 and K 7 , the probability of satisfying Equation (6) is 2 −7 . Hence, for each guessed 80 bits in Step 2, there are expected 2 23 guesses out of 2 32 possible K 6 , K 7 entering Step 6. We notice that for each guess entering Step 6, the attack still needs to exhaustively search for the remaining 16 key bits. Therefore, Step 6 takes 2 39 encryptions for each guess in Step 2.
The running time of the whole attack is dominated by Step 3. The time complexity of the attack is 2 46 · 2 80 = 2 126 encryptions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented several integral attacks on reduced MISTY1 block cipher. Our attack improved the 5-round integral attack presented in [6] with the use of the F O Relation. We also extended the attack to 6-round with all F L layers by using weakness of the key schedule algorithm.
The existence of the F O Relation stems from the structure of the F O function and the fact that the key is XORed in the F O function. The resulting diffusion effect is too weak to defeat popular cryptanalysis techniques, such as differential cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis.
Our attack also indicates that the correspondence between subkeys used and the 128-bit key might be too simple. Further exploration of this weakness of the key schedule is still worthy studying. 
